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A REMEDY EVEN THE PLAINTIFFS DON'T LIKE. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S
VACATUR OF THE CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULE
North Carolina v. E.P.A.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) was a cap-and-trade
program designed to control the regional emissions of SO2 and NOx. It
functionally merged two separate rules, The Acid Rain Trading Program,
and the NOx SIP Call into one. While the two previous rules had passed
judicial muster, CAIR did not, and was vacated by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. This decision not only surprised all parties
involved, but is believed by all parties to be incorrect because it was
inconsistent with a previous holding. It has created many problems that
will be difficult to fix without new legislation from Congress.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) for the purpose of reducing or
eliminating the impact of upwind sources of fine particulate matter and
smog on out-of-state downwind locations. 2 The EPA is required by Title I
of the Clean Air Act to "issue national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") for each pollutant that "cause[s] or contribute[s] to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare..."3
To comply with Title I of the Clean Air Act, the EPA requires each
state to create a state implementation plan ("SIP") to meet the NAAQS
requirements for air quality.4 If a state fails to implement an approved
531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
2 Id. at 903.
3 Id. at 9o 1.
4 Id. at 901-02.
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SIP, the EPA must promulgate a federal implementation plan (FIP) for the
state to follow.5
One provision of Title I requires SIPs to prohibit the emission of
any air pollutant from a state in an amount which will "contribute
significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any
other State with respect to any [NAAQS]..." In order to implement this
provision, the EPA instituted NOx SIP Call to impose a duty on certain
upwind sources to reduce their nitrogen oxides (NOx) to acceptable
levels.7 This program also created an optional cap-and-trade program for
nitrogen oxides.8
CAIR was challenged by separate bodies on a wide range of
issues.9 North Carolina objected to "EPA's trading programs, EPA's
interpretation of the "interfere with maintenance" language in section
1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), Phase Two's 2015 compliance date, the NOx
Compliance Supplement Pool, EPA's interpretation of "will" in "will
contribute significantly," and the air quality threshold for PM2.5." 0
Several electric utility companies challenged "the EPA's authority under
Title I and Title IV to limit the number of Title IV allowances, and to
require units exempt from Title IV to acquire Title IV allowances."" A
third group referred to as "Entergy" by the court, contested EPA's
authority to "base state NOx budgets on the number of coal-, oil-, and gas-
fired facilities a state has compared to other states in the CAIR region."'l2
Also, several electric utilities argued against their inclusion in CAIR, as
well as the 2009 start date for Phase One of the NOx restrictions.13
The court dealt with each issue individually, finding that CAIR
was fatally flawed in five out of the nine issues. 14 Ultimately the court
held that because the EPA adopted CAIR as one integral action, the only








14 See generally N.C. v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (2008).
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proper remedy was to vacate CAIR completely, and its associated federal
implementation plan (FIP), and remand to the EPA.15  If the EPA
promulgates a new rule it must be consistent with this decision.16
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1970, Congress passed Title I of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in
order to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources."
The CAA accomplished this goal by first requiring the EPA to issue
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). 18 In order to achieve the
desired standards, each state was required to create a state implementation
plan (SIP).19 If a state failed to create a SIP according to Title I rules, the
EPA was required to create a federal implementation plan (FIP) for that
state to follow.20
In 1977 Congress amended the CAA by adding provisions that
required the designation of areas as attainment, nonattainment, or
unclassifiable. 2 1 The 1977 amendments also contained changes to section
110(a)(2)(D) and added section 126, two provisions on the interstate
transport of air pollutants. 22 Section 11 0(a)(2)(D) later became the basis
of the NOx SIP Call, while section 126 gave states the right to petition the
EPA to take action against non-compliant upwind states.
In 1990 Congress again amended the CAA in order to address the
continued nonattainment of 1-hour ozone NAAQS. Also part of the 1990
amendments was the Title IV acid rain program.23  The goal of the
1 N.C. v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 901 (2008).
6 id.
17 Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended 42
U.S.C §§ 7401-7700 (2006)).
* Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7409(a)(1)(A) (2006).
SId. § 7410(a)(1).
2o Id. § 7410(c)(1)(A),(B).
21 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 687-88
(amending § 107(d)(I)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)).
22 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 687-88
(amending § 1 10(a)(2)(D)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)).
23 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
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program was to reduce the acidic content of the air by reducing annual
emissions of sulfur dioxide.24 The central means by which Title IV was to
achieve its goal was by instituting a cap-and-trade program for sulfur
dioxide (S02).25 The program granted allowances of sulfur dioxide
emissions to individual units, and made these allowances transferable.26
In 1998, the EPA instituted a regional cap-and-trade program known as
the NOx SIP Call.27
A. NOx SIP Call
In accordance with the Clean Air Act the EPA enacted its final rule
known as the NOx SIP Call on October 27, 1998.28 The EPA stated that
under CAA section 11 0(a)(1) and 1 10(k)(5), new SIPs must be created in
order to meet the requirements of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 29 The rule
required 22 states to submit revised SIPs that would effectively prohibit
NOx gas, a precursor of ozone (smog) pollution, for the purpose of
reducing the transport of these gases across state boundaries in the eastern
United States.3 0 This reduction was meant to have the dual benefit of
improving public health and preventing upwind states from significantly
contributing to or interfering with the maintenance of downwind state's
24 42 U.S.C. § 765 1(b) (2000).
25 d
26 d
27 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 71, 75, 96 (2008) (originally published in 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356-01
(Oct. 27, 1998)).
28 Id. The official name of the final rule is "Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone," but within the rule itself is referred
to as the NOx SIP Call by the EPA and in general by all who reference it. Id.
29 Id. Section 110(k)(5) gives the EPA the right to call for revisions of state SIPs if it
deems them inadequate to meet the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (2000).
3o 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.10, 51.121 (2008) (originally published in 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356-01
(Oct. 27, 1998)). The rule also included the District of Columbia. The 22 states were
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
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attainment of 1-hour and 8-hour ozone NAAQS. 3 ' The EPA considered
the NOx SIP Call to be a sig ficant step towards reducing ozone in the
eastern half of the country. The EPA gave each state 12 months to
revise their SIPs, and determined that the new SIP calls must be
implemented by May 1, 2003.33 The EPA also required each state to
submit a special onetime statewide NOx emissions inventory report in
2007.34 The final rule required only ozone-season (summer) emissions
reporting.35
The EPA determined that ozone was a regional scale problem that
required a collective contribution approach to achieve regional scale
reductions. 36  In accordance with this regional approach, the EPA
determined the phrase "contribute significantly" in section
1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) to include both upwind emissions and their downwind
impact, as well as cost factors relating to the costs of the upwind emissions
reductions. 37  In order to determine what emissions contributed
significantly to downwind nonattainment the EPA provided a multi-factor
test of four prongs, three dealing with air quality, while the fourth
considered the "availability of highly cost effective control measures for
upwind emissions." 38 The EPA determined a reduction of emissions was
highly cost effective if it could be affected at a rate of $2,000 per ton of
ozone season NOx.3 9
As part of the program the EPA gave each state an emissions
budget which constituted the amount of pollution they were allowed to
emit.40 In order to assist states in achieving their budget limits, the EPA
3 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.10, 51.121 (2008) (originally published in 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356-01
(Oct. 27, 1998)). The EPA 1-hour standard ceased to apply to several areas after the
NOx SIP final rule, but remained in effect for most urban areas in the eastern United
States. Id.
32 Nox SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,359 (Oct. 27, 1998).
" Id. at 57,447-57,366.
34 Id. at 57,455.
" Id. at 57,366.
16 Id. at 57,375-76.
1 Id. at 57, 376.
3 8 id
39 Id. at 57,399.40 Id at 57,405.
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developed a multi-state NOx trading program. 4 1  The purpose of the
program was to maintain appropriate levels of emissions reductions
through the use of a region-wide cap, but allow the use of a market-based
system to make it as cost effective as possible.42 The system was
developed in consultation with and support of many states, industry
members, and environmental groups and was optional provision of the
NOx SIP Call.43 The trading program allowed states in nonattainment to
buy allowances from states with excess reductions in order to come into
compliance with the rule." The program also allowed banking of
allowances, or the ability of a state in attainment to save its excess
reductions for a later time.4 5
B. Michigan
Various as Rects of the NOx SIP Call provision were challenged in
Michigan v. EPA. The court in Michigan decided eight separate claims
made against the NOx SIP Call, but only one becomes critical to the later
decision regarding CAIR.47 The key part of the courts analysis in
Michigan was its analysis of the term "significant" in section
7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 48 Four challenges were made against the EPA's
interpretation of the term as used in the NOx SIP Call.49
First, petitioners argued that the EPA acted contrary to precedent
in its interpretation of the phrase.5 0 The court said that there is nothing in
41 Id. at 57,456.
42 id.
43 Id. at 57,457. States which chose not to adopt the model rule had the option to either
incorporate the rule by reference into its state regulations, or adopt state regulations that
mirrored the rule with some minor variations the rule allowed for. Id. at 57,458.
"Id. at 57,457-72.
4 5 Id. at 57,473.
46 Mich. v. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
47 Id. at 663.
48 See id. at 674-81.
4 9 Id. at 674.
50 Id. Prior to the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) said
states needed only to stop sources from emitting pollution that would prevent attainment
or maintenance by a downwind state. Id. This was a lesser standard than the post-
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the section or any other part of the statute that specifies how to define
significant, and neither had the EPA bound itself to any.5 ' The court held
that the states failed to show any instance of the EPA having created a
binding concept of what the term meant, and denied the claim.52
Second, the petitioners argued that the EPA was not permitted to
consider the cost of reducing ozone when determining what constituted
significant.53 The Court first stated that it had no quarrel with the EPA's
method of determining which states were significant contributors. 54 The
Court acknowledged that the method of reducing emissions by the use of
highly cost effective controls was only mandated after a state had been
deemed a significant contributor.5 5 They said that "naturally, the ultimate
line of 'significance,'...would vary from state to state depending on
variations in cutback costs." 56  Petitioners sited Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA as precedent for their contention that costs cannot
be the primary consideration of the EPA in effectuating a statute to protect
the public health.
The Court stated that the program seemed to have no rationale
other that cost reduction, and that under petitioner's proposed reading of
section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) it would be invalid. The Court also says it
only assumes the existence of the allowance trading program because no
one has challenged its adoption.59 The Court went on to state that due to
the inconsistent nature of the petitioners claims "it would be at very least
ironic for us to say there is 'clear congressional intent to preclude
amendment language of contribute significantly. Id. The states argued that previous case




54 Id. at 675. The EPA determined the 23 jurisdictions to be significant contributors by
measuring the NOx parts per billion that were transmitted to downwind states. Id.
5s Id.
56id
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consideration of cost."' 60 The Court found three separate reasons to reject
the petitioners claim against the use of cost in determining significance.
First, "significant" is an ambiguous term, does not in itself convey
a one dimensional definition, and in fact in previous case law actually
requires the implication of cost.61 Second, a health-only definition of the
word significant contains fatal flaws because it leaves no way to determine
a baseline of emission levels, since any amount of ozone has adverse
health effects. 62 Third, and what the Court says is the most formidable
obstacle for petitioners, is the settled law of the court that consideration of
cost can only be Precluded upon clear congressional intent, which the
Court did not find. Ultimately the Court holds that there was nothing in
the "text, structure, or history" of the section, that precluded the EPA from
using a cost-effective approach to the regulation of emissions.6
The third primary argument made by petitioners against the EPA's
interpretation of the term significant in section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) is that it
constitutes a uniform control strategy and is irrational.65 They argue that it
causes states making small contributions to downwind nonattainment must
make just as much of a reduction as states which make large ones.66 The
court said that this is a logical result of their upholding of the use of cost
differentials, and therefore must be upheld. Petitioners also argued that
it was irrational because upwind states that were further in distance
contributed less than states closer to nonattainment areas.68 The court held
that since there was no clear benefit to an exposure-based trading system
as opposed to a cost-based one, they had no basis to upset the EPA's
decision.6 9  The fourth and final argument against the EPA's
interpretation of significant is one of nondelegation.70  Basing their
6 0 Id. at 677 (citing Natural Res. Def Council, 824 F.2d at 1163).
6i Id. at 677-78.






6 9 Id. at 680.70 1d.
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argument on American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, petitioners essential
argument is the EPA's cost-effectiveness standard is so vague that it has
no perceivable boundary.7' Several ancillary issues were remanded for
further consideration, but the court dismissed the majority of the other
claims raised against the NOx SIP Call, including the key issue of the
interpretation of the word "significant." 72 Judge Sentelle gives a notable
dissent, arguing that the majority makes a mistake in allowing the use of a
cost effectiveness approach.73 He believed Congress clearly stated that it
was the amount of the pollution that determined the significant
contribution, and that the cost effectiveness approach did not meet this
standard. 74
Following the decision in Michigan, aspects of the NOx SIP Call
were again challenged in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA.75 The Court in
Appalachian, like the one in Michigan, also stated the rule did not violate
the Clean Air Act's commitment to cooperative federalism. 76 The Court
also upheld the Michigan standard of determining "significant
contribution" based on a regional cost-effectiveness model as opposed to a
test that required sources within each state to independently meet the
EPA's threshold for downwind nonattainment.77
C. CAIR
Following the successful implementation of both the 1990 Acid
Rain Program and the 1998 NOx SIP Call, the EPA issued the Clean Air
Interstate Rule (CAIR) in 2005.78 CAIR included revisions of cap-and-
trade programs outlined in the Acid Rain Program and replaced those in
the NOx SIP Call. 79 The EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule
71 Id. (citing Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh'g
granted in part, denied in part).
72 Id. at 695.
73 Id. at 695-97.
74 Id. at 696.
75 Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
76Id. at 1046-48.
n Id. at 1049.
78 Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).
79Id.
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(CAIR) for the purpose of reducing or eliminating the impact of upwind
sources of fine particulate matter and smog on out-of-state downwind
locations.8 0 The EPA established CAIR based on the authority of The
Clean Air Act section 1 10(a)(2).8 ' The EPA was required by Title I of the
Clean Air Act to issue national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
each pollutant that contributes or causes air pollution which could
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.82
To comply with Title I of the Clean Air Act, the EPA required
each state to create a SIP to meet the NAAQS requirements for air
quality. 83 If a state failed to implement an approved SIP, the EPA must
promulgate a FIP for the state to follow.84 A total of 28 eastern states and
the District of Columbia were required to reduce S02 and/or NOx
emissions under CAIR. The emissions reductions were to be
implemented in two phases. The two phases of NOx were 2009 and 2014
respectively, while the S02 phases were 2010 and 2015.86
The EPA believed CAIR was necessary for two main reasons.
First, it felt that CAIR would address serious health concerns, including
premature mortality and aggravated respiratory disease, which were
caused by the fine particles caused by NOx and S02 emissions.88 Second,
it would help prevent downwind states from incurring unfair costs of
pollution reduction due to their air quality being diminished by upwind
states. 89 The EPA called this second provision the "' ood neighbor'
requirement of section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Clean Air Act.90
8 Id. at 25,166.82 N.C. v. E.P.A, 531 F.3d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
" Id. at 902.
8 Id.
85 Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,167 (May 12, 2005).86 id
8 1 d. at 25,168.
88 Id. The EPA estimated by 2015 the annual benefits of the program would include
17,000 fewer premature fatalities, 8,700 fewer cases of chronic bronchitis, 22,000 fewer
non-fatal heart attacks, 10,500 fewer hospitalization admissions, and over one million
fewer work loss days. Id. at 25,166.89 id.
9
' Id. at 25,170.
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The good neighbor provision required SIPs to prohibit the
emission of any air pollutant from a state in an amount which would either
contribute significantly to nonattainment of another state, or interfere with
that state's maintenance of NAAQS. 91 Prior to CAIR, the EPA had
already instituted the NOx SIP Call in 1998 to impose a duty on certain
upwind sources to reduce their nitrogen oxides (NOx) to acceptable levels
in accordance with section 11 0(a)(2)(D).92 This program also created an
optional cap-and-trade program for nitrogen oxides. 93 CAIR was designed
in part to replace the less extensive NOx SIP Call.94 The EPA felt it was
necessary to do this for two reasons.95 First, EPA believed that because
some years had passed since the passage of the NOx SIP Call, it would be
better to use updated air quality and emissions data for a new rule.96
Second, even with the NOx SIP Call in place, several states were still
having difficulty meeting the air quality standards, and the EPA felt it
should go beyond the previous modeling done in the NOx SIP Call in
order to ensure continued progress towards attainment.9 7 The EPA stated
several times that it relied heavily on the NOx SIP Call in creating the
CAIR rule.9 8 As the NOx SIP Call was only a seasonal (summer)
regulation, and CAIR was an annual one, the EPA decided to implement
two separate NOx trading programs in CAIR to avoid complications. 99
CAIR outlined three separate cap and trade programs, annual NOx and
S02 programs, as well as a seasonal NOx program. 00 These programs
were designed by the EPA to mirror the structure of the NOx SIP Call and
to coordinate with the Acid Rain Program.' 0 The CAIR ozone-season
NOx cap and trade rules were distinct from those of the NOx SIP Call in
9' N.C. v. E.P.A, 531 F.3d 896, 901, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
92 Id., Nox SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998).
9 NC., 531 F.3d at 902.
94 Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,166 (May 12, 2005).
9 Id. at 25,168.
96 Id.
97id
9 Id. at 25,171.
9 Id. at 25,289-90.
' Id. at 25,273.
10o' Id.
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that they allowed for unrestricted banking of allowances and for facility
level compliance.' 02
With this legal background, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
addressed the issues in the instant case.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In North Carolina, the Court held that because there were several
fatal flaws in CAIR, and because the EPA had adopted it as one, integral
action, the rule in its entirety must be vacated and remanded to the EPA.103
The first flaw found by the court was in CAIR's trading programs for SO2
and NOx, which the court said failed to meet the goals of section
1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).' 04 The EPA's trading program essentially amounted to
a "regionwide approach" which failed to prohibit sources "within the State
from contribut[ing] significantly to nonattainment in...any other State..."
because sources could purchase enough NOx and SO 2 allowances to cover
current emissions, resulting in no change. 05
North Carolina also challenged the EPA's interpretation of the
"interfere with maintenance" provision of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I),
stating it should include states, such as Georgia, that are projected to
barely meet attainment levels of NAAQS in 2010.106 Analyzing this
question for the first time, the court found that the EPA's failure to use the
"interfere with maintenance" provision separately from the "significant
contribution" provision of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) amounted to "reading
a substantive issue out of a statute." 0 7 Thus the court held the EPA
unlawfully nullified the statute and provided no protection for downwind
areas that, despite EPA's predictions, still found themselves struggling to
meet NAAQS due to upwind interference in 20 10.108
102 Id. at 25,288.
'03 N.C. v. E.P.A, 531 F.3d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
'0 Id. at 907.
05 id.
'o' Id. at 908.
107 Id. at 909-10.
s Id. at 910-11.
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The court next addressed North Carolina's argument that the 2015
deadline for upwind states to eliminate their "significant contribution" to
downwind nonattainment failed to meet the statutory requirement of
achieve attainment "as expeditiously as pgracticable."10 The court held
that the EPA is required to consider all provisions in Title I, including the
provisions mandating compliance deadlines for downwind states by
2010.10 The fourth flaw the court found in the CAIR rule was the
challenge by Entergy that the budgets and regionwide cap set by the rule
were "arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law.""'
The EPA failed to meet the requirements of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)
because it based its choice of SO2 emissions caps on Title IV
allowances."12
Entergy also challenged the EPA's use of "fuel factors" to adjust
the regional NOx cap among CAIR states." 3  The court held that the
EPA's program must fail because it makes one state's significant
contribution depend on another state's cost of eliminating emissions.114
Despite the laudatory motives behind the program, the EPA had no
authority to use the fuel-adjustment factors to shift the burden of emission
reduction from one state to another." 5
The court also held that the EPA had no statutory authority to
terminate or limit Title IV allowances, either through a trading Trogram or
by requiring that SIPs have allowance retirement provisions." The EPA
was created by statute itself, and if there is no statute conferring it
authority on an issue, it has none.11 7 In addition the court held that the
inclusion of Texas and Florida in CAIR was not prejudicial, but that the
inclusion of Minnesota in the program should be remanded for further
consideration. 18
"' Id. at 911.
"o Id. at 912.
'" Id. at 916.
112 Id. at 918.
"' Id. at 918-19.
114 Id. at 919-20.
.s Id. at 921.
"' Id. at 922.
117 Id.
"' Id. at 923-28.
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The court found they could not edit CAIR to correct the flaws of
the rule, because it would leave substantial doubt that the EPA would have
adopted the edited version on their own.l 19 The court ruled that because
all of CAIR's components must stand or fall together, the EPA must redo
its analysis from the ground up.120 Thus, CAIR and its associated FIP
programs were vacated and remanded to the EPA.121
V. COMMENT
CAIR is the third of three major cap-and-trade programs
promulgated by the EPA, but the first to be struck down by the court.
Both the Acid Rain Program and the NOx SIP Call not only survived
previous challen es, but continued in full effect even after the ruling in
North Carolina. 22 The EPA's ability to promulgate any new Title I cap-
and-trade program, should it choose to do so, as well as State and other
emission sources' ability to challenge it, are contingent on the
understanding of why this distinction was made. The question that thus
presents itself is what distinguished CAIR from the Acid Rain Program
and the NOx SIP Call in such a way that would cause the court to vacate
only that program, while allowing the other similar rules to remain in
effect?
Although the court found five fatal flaws in CAIR, on five very
different issues, all of them but one are united by a common theme: the
violation of section 1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).123 Of the five fatal flaws the court
found in the CAIR rule, three were unique issues of the rule itself, while
two of the flaws found were very close to similar measures in the Acid
Rain Program and the NOx SIP Call that were previously found to be
acceptable by the court.124 The regional cost-effective approach for cap-
and-trade emissions reduction, as well as the budget levels the EPA chose
Id. at 929.
12o id.
121 Id. at 930.
122 Id. at 922, 930.
123 See supra Part IV.
124 See supra Part IV.
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to set for those emissions, were both found to be acceptable in the two
prior rules, but both were rejected by the court in North Carolina.125
Why did the court reject CAIR's regional cost-effective cap-and-
trade program while acknowledging it had recently accepted a
substantially similar program in Michigan under the NOx SIP Call?l 26
The court admited that in Michigan it deferred to the EPA's judgment and
granted approval of "emissions controls that do not correlate directly with
each state's relative contribution to a specific downwind nonattainment
area."1 27  The Court in North Carolina, stated that Michigan, despite
having analyzed and ruled on the issues of consideration of cost, uniform
controls, and the NOx SIP Call's interpretation of "significant"
contribution in section 110(a)(2)(2D)(i)(I), never ruled on the legality of
NOx SIP Call's trading program.' However, while the lawfulness of the
entire rule may not have been challenged, the regional cost-effective
approach to emission reduction, the issue at hand, certainly was, as the
court itself stated.129
In distinguishing their decisions in Michigan and the instant case,
the court seems to give some weight to their conclusion that CAIR was
designed to be a complete remedy to section 1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).130 On the
page in the federal regulations cited by the Court is an introduction to the
emission reduction requirements of the CAIR FIP.'"' The language seems
fairly general, not distinct in any substantial way from the NOx SIP Call
language, and never uses the phrase "complete remedy." While it is
certain that it could be argued that the EPA considered CAIR a "complete
remedy" to SO2 and NOx emissions, it seems a similar argument could be
made for both the Acid Rain Program and the NOx SIP Call, as any clear
distinction in language from the EPA is unclear in the rules.
125 N.C., 531 F.3d at 916-20.
126 Id. at 908.
127 d
1281d
12 9 Mich. v. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
130 N.C., 531 F.3d at 908 (citing Revisions to the Acid Rain Program, 71 Fed. Reg.
25,340).
131 Revisions to the Acid Rain Program, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,340).
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The court gave two reasons why their decision in North Carolina
and Michigan were not at odds with each other. First, the issue of lawful
adoption of the rule was never addressed, and second, CAIR is different in
that it was designed to be a complete remedy to section 1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
It could possibly be argued that these reasons are fairly weak justifications
for the overturning of a fundamental part of a rule which had previously
withstood the Courts scrutiny, and that while the court attempts to show a
harmony in its decision here and in Michigan, they are in effect overruling
their previous holding on the issue. 132 As shown in the legal background
section of this case note, there were substantial challenges made in
Michigan against the highly cost effective approach towards regulation
used in the NOx SIP Call. The approach used in CAIR is virtually the
same, because as previously noted, CAIR was designed almost completely
around the already existing NOx SIP Call. The court in North Carolina
took the viewpoint of the dissent in Michigan, and effectively overturned
that ruling. Despite the Courts best efforts there seems to be no way to
harmonize the two decisions.
One pair of writers believes that section 1 10(a)(2)(A) specifically
calls for the use of cost control measures.' 3 3 The section calls for SIPs to
include control measures that include economic incentives, marketable
permits, and auctions of allowances. They believe if the EPA would have
based its program on this section as opposed to section 1 10(a)(2)(D)(i).13 4
While this is an interesting thought, it would not have altered CAIR's
fundamental lack of state specific regulation, and if the Court felt strongly
enough about the issue to overturn Michigan this likely would not have
changed its mind.
A. Effects of the Decision
132 One different judge on the panel might have affected decision, or a judge could have
had a change of heart.
133 Peter H. Wyckoff & Michael R. Barr, District of Columbia Circuit Strikes Down U.S.
EPA 's CAIR Cap-and-Trade Program, ENV'T, LAND USE & NAT. RESOURCES (Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New York, N.Y.) July 17, 2008, available at
http://www.pillsburylaw.com (search for "CAIR Cap-and-Trade Program"; then follow
"Client Alert-District of Columbia Circuit Strikes Down U.S. EPA's CAIR Cap-and-
Trade Program" hyperlink; then click "View PDF" button).
134 Id. at 3.
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Fallout from the Court's decision could be substantial. One top
EPA official stated at a Senate hearing that "it's kind of like dropping a
bomb in the middle of the air program."' 3 5  The Court's decision was
unexpected by all parties and left many "stunned." 136 Some members of
Congress have called the decision a "setback," and are worried it will
affect other similar programs.' 37 Ironically many of the same parties that
challenged CAIR are now pushing for its reinstitution, because they never
expected it to be vacated.138 A representative from Duke Energy told CBS
News that they never intended for CAIR to be overturned, and that the
Court had thrown out the baby with the bathwater."l 39 An official from
one environmental group said "there is panic of enormous proportion."l40
One of the first consequences of the decision was a significant
reduction in the value of emissions credits that power companies had
already purchased in order to comply with the CAIR rule.' 4 1 This could
potentially result in significant losses for many companies.142 One report
said that S02 credits dropped from $300 to as low as $102.143 Not only
that, but many companies purchased allowances in preparation for CAIR
135 Key Democrats Resist GOP Plan for Narrow Bill to Fix CAIR Vacatur, CLEAN AIR
REPORT, Aug. 7, 2008.
136 Victor Fiatt, Taking Environmental Laws Seriously: North Carolina v. EPA,
UNIVERSITY OF HouSTON LAW CENTER FACULTY BLOG, Aug. 6, 2008,
http://www.uhlawblog.com/2008/08/articles/issues-of-the-day/taking-environmental-
laws-seriously-north-carolina-v-epa.
13 Potential Legislative Fix on the Horizon for Clean Air Interstate Rule Vacated by
Appeals Court, INFORMATION ALERT, (National Conference of State Legislatures), Sep.
3, 2008, available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/standcomm/scenvir/CAIRInfoAlert.pdf.
138 Senators Say CAIR Fix Unlikely Until Next Year, ENERGY TRADER, July 30, 2008.
1 Bush's Clean Air Plan Shutdown, CBS NEWS, July 12, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/12/health/main4255752.shtml.
140 Cathy Cash & Christine Cordner, Senators Ask Utilities to Operate Emission Controls
Despite Absence of CAIR Program, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Aug. 18, 2008.
141 CAIR Ruling Forces Industry Financial Losses Over Emissions Credits, CLEAN AIR
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and with the decision to vacate it those allowances are no longer
needed.'"
The Court's decision has also created serious problems for
companies who must now comply with NOx SIP Call regulations in
2009.145 The loss of CAIR's benefits will hurt electric generating units'
ability to compete, and these costs will likely be passed on to the
consumer.146 One industry official told the Senate subcommittee that the
loss of CAIR created a huge regulatory hole.14 7 The Court stated that the
companies could go back to using the NOx SIP Call allowances and
trading program, but they didn't seem to realize that these allowances will
not exist, as the NOx SIP Call was to end with CAIR.148 Another problem
is that states have already implemented their own legislation based on the
assumption that CAIR would be in place, and repealed their own NOx
seasonal trading programs. 149
B. The Future of CAIR
There are three likely ways a new CAIR can be implemented, and
it seems likely that one or more will occur by at least the end of 2009;
Congress may pass new legislation which would legalize the cost
effectiveness approach to the cap-and-trade system taken by CAIR, the
E.P.A. may sufficiently revise CAIR, or the EPA might appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court, and then settle with the parties involved, to
effectively nullify the D.C. Circuit's decision.
The first possible resolution, which involved new Congressional
legislation began to be pushed almost as soon as the decision came down.
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee's Clean Air and
Nuclear Safety Subcommittee held a hearing on July 29 to review the
144 id
145 Senators Say CAIR Fix Unlikely Until Next Year, ENERGY TRADER, July 30, 2008.
146 id
14 7 id.
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decision's implications.' 50  Lawmakers on the subcommittee seemed to
prefer a legislative fix to the problem in order to avoid any more
challenges from the court.1st Despite the consensus of a need to move
forward, political posturing made it immediately apparent that there would
likely be no new legislation until 2009 after a new administration was in
place.152 Democratic Senator Tom Carper the chairman of the Senate
Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee has authored a bill called the
Clean Air Planning Act which would create a national emissions trading
market for NOx and S02, but does not believe he has the votes to pass
it.153
Besides a new act, some groups are pushing for the codification of
the first phase of CAIR, to provide a two year interim resolution until
more legislation could be passed.154 There are reservations from various
industry and environmental groups to this move as well, and it is also
unlikely to occur.155  Democrats were in favor of such a move, while
Republicans also wanted to codify phase II of the act, which many
believed did not provide enough regulation. 156 Republicans blamed
Democrats for the failure of the Clean Skies legislation of 2003, which
they believed led to the vacature of CAIR. 57  Ultimately the White
House's refusal to sign legislation that did not also codify phase II, along
with Democratic insistence that only phase I be codified, led to a stalemate
1 5 Potential Legislative Fix on the Horizon for Clean Air Interstate Rule Vacated by
Appeals Court, INFORMATION ALERT, (National Conference of State Legislatures), Sep.
3, 2008, available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/standcomm/scenvir/CAIRInfoAlert.pdf.151 id.
152 Senators Say CAIR Fix Unlikely Until Next Year, ENERGY TRADER, July 30, 2008.
153 d154 Key Democrats Resist GOP Plan for Narrow Bill to Fix CAIR Vacatur, CLEAN AIR
REPORT, Aug. 7, 2008.
I5 ssId
156 Hill Effort to Pass CAIR Fix Collapses Amid Continued Disagreements, INSIDE THE
EPA, Sep. 19, 2008.
157 Key Democrats Resist GOP Plan for Narrow Bill to Fix CAIR Vacatur, CLEAN AIR
REPORT, Aug. 7, 2008; The Clear Skies Act of 2003 sought to do much the same things
that CAIR did, but was never able to make it out of committee due to Democratic
opposition. See generally Energy Information Administration, Analysis of Clear Skies,
Clean Air Planning and Clean Air Power Acts of 2003,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/csa (providing a complete analysis).
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that will likely not be resolved until the Obama administration takes
office.'
The second option for saving CAIR follows a rehearing of the
ruling by the D.C. Court. The EPA filed a petition for rehearing with the
Court on September 24, 2008.159 Environmental groups and Industry
members also filed petitions for a rehearing.160 Some say a rehearing is
unlikely because the decision was unanimous. 16 1  All three groups of
petitioners said the Court's finding is inconsistent with its 2000 Michigan
ruling.' 62 Despite the many substantive issues raised by the petitioners, if
only two additional judges are able to rule on the rehearing, one of the
previous three judges would have to change his mind in order to get a
reversal.163
Following the reaction to its ruling, and in response to the petition
by the EPA, the D.C. court granted a rehearing. The court asked the
parties if they were in fact seeking a vacatur of CAIR, and whether the
court should stay its mandate until the EPA is able to promulgate a new
rule.164 The court decided to remand the case without vacatur in order to
allow the EPA time to formulate an appropriate rule.165  The court
acknowledged that its previous ruling would have created greater
environmental problems by removing CAIR without having a rule to
replace it with.166 The court did not place a deadline on when the new rule
158 Cathy Cash, White House Backs Call for Enacting Partial CAIR Law, to Give Some
Certainty to Air Rules, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEKLY, Sep. 22, 2008.
159 Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, N.C v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (2008)
(No. 05-1244 and consolidated cases), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/cair/docs/CAIRRehearingPetition asFiled.
pdf.
' Requests for CAIR Rehearing Face an Uphill Battle Despite 'Flawed' Ruling, INSIDE
THE EPA, Oct. 3, 2008.
161 Amena Saiyid, US EPA Trying to Save Seasonal NOx Trading Program Post-CAIR,
PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Aug. 11, 2008.
162 id
13id.
54North Carolina v. E.P.A. 550 F.3d 1176, 1177 (2008).
161 Id. at 1178.
6 Id.
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had to be in place, but stated it was not an indefinite stay on the court's
decision. 67
A third option which does not seem to have gained much traction
is for the EPA to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and then settle with petitioners, effectively nullifying the judgment.
Some believe this to be "reasonably likely," but it does not seem to be the
direction the EPA, petitioners or Congress is going.'6 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in North Carolina decided that the Clean Air Interstate
rule was fatally flawed in five different ways and decided it was necessary
to vacate the entire rule. In doing so they claimed to be making a decision
that could be harmonized with their previous ruling in Michigan. In fact
they were overturning Michigan, much to the dismay of every party
involved. Instead of bringing remedy to any of the myriad of issues
brought by petitioners against the EPA, the court created a large amount of
confusion, disarray, and many additional problems. It seems very likely
that some form of CAIR will return in 2009, with the most probable being
a new act passed by the recently increased Democratic majority Congress
and White House. Some version of Tom Carper's Clean Air Planning Act
will likely be what ultimately resolves this issue, and nullifies the decision
of the D.C. Circuit.
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168 Peter Spinney, CAIR's Rejection Ups the Stakes for NOx Reduction, THE
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